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Abstract 67 
Objective 68 
Transparent evidence-based decision making has been promoted worldwide to engender trust 69 
in science and policy-making. Yet, little attention has been given to transparency 70 
implementation. The degree of transparency (focused on how uncertain evidence was 71 
handled) during the development of folate and vitamin D Dietary Reference Values was 72 
explored in three a priori defined areas: value request; evidence evaluation; final values.  73 
Design 74 
Qualitative case studies (semi-structured interviews and desk research). A common protocol 75 
was used for data collection, interview thematic analysis and reporting. Results were co-76 
ordinated via cross-case synthesis. 77 
Setting 78 
Australia & New Zealand, Netherlands, Nordic countries, Poland, Spain and UK.  79 
Subjects 80 
Twenty one interviews were conducted in six case studies.  81 
Results 82 
Transparency of process was not universally observed across countries or areas of the 83 
recommendation setting process. Transparency practices were most commonly seen 84 
surrounding the request to develop reference values (e.g., access to risk manager/assessor 85 
problem formulation discussions) and evidence evaluation (e.g., disclosure of risk assessor 86 
data sourcing/evaluation protocols). Fewer transparency practices were observed to assist 87 
with handling uncertainty in the evidence-base during the development of quantitative 88 
reference values.  89 
Conclusion  90 
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Implementation of transparency policies may be limited by a lack of dedicated resources and 91 
best practice procedures, particularly to assist with the latter stages of reference value 92 
development. Challenges remain regarding the best practice for transparently communicating 93 
the influence of uncertain evidence on the final reference values. Resolving this issue may 94 
assist the evolution of nutrition risk assessment and better inform the recommendation setting 95 
process. 96 
97 
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Introduction 98 
 99 
Historic public health scares (e.g., in the UK following the Phillips inquiry into vCJD/nvCJD, 100 
the human prion disease caused by the BSE crisis in 1996) contributed to a general 101 
commitment of transparency, openness and evidence-based (information indicating whether a 102 
belief or proposition is true or valid) decision making in food-related science and policy. (1) 103 
This resulted in the formal separation of science and policy activities and adoption of the risk 104 
analysis framework. (2) 105 
 106 
The risk analysis framework was first adapted for use in the food area following a joint 107 
FAO/WHO expert consultation in 1995. (3) The framework has been comprised of three 108 
interconnected activities: risk assessment (scientific evaluation of health effects), risk 109 
management (policy decisions to minimise risk) and risk communication (exchange of risk 110 
information in/outside the framework). A principle has been to maintain the separation of 111 
activities whilst recognising the interaction between activities (e.g., separation can vary from 112 
different organisations to different groups/tasks within the same organisation responsible for 113 
different activities). (3)  114 
 115 
Central to implementation of the risk analysis framework has been the encouragement of 116 
transparency and disclosure of uncertainty in the evidence underlying scientific advice (risk 117 
assessment) or political decision making (risk management). (2, 4) The transparent handling 118 
of uncertainty may refer to “explicit recognition of any uncertainty either in the current state 119 
of knowledge or in the adequacy of the available data” (e.g., accuracy/quality or degree of 120 
incomplete/quantity of data). (5)Transparency and openness have been promoted to achieve 121 
greater accountability and credibility during risk analysis; improved communication between 122 
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stakeholders (e.g., science, policy, industry, health practice) and safeguard the abuse of public 123 
organisation power or resources. (2, 6-8).  124 
 125 
Policies of transparency can be found across various public health disciplines responsible for 126 
risk analysis activities e.g., the European Food Safety Authority, (EFSA); the National 127 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, (NICE); the Food and Agriculture Organisation 128 
of the United Nations/World Health Organisation, (FAO/WHO). (2, 4, 9) Implementation of 129 
these policies requires the process and outcome of a risk analysis activity to be evident and 130 
obvious i.e. documented and understandable (transparent) as well as accessible (open). (7, 8, 131 
10) (11)This may be related to the organisation responsible for a risk analysis activity (e.g., 132 
disclosure of organisation role and responsibility, membership, confidentiality signed 133 
agreements, declaration of interest) or the technical content of the activity (e.g., disclosure of 134 
non-/published requests, methods, findings and conclusions via websites, reports and 135 
manuscripts, meeting minutes and agendas, open consultations and open meetings, release of 136 
data and study results etc.).  137 
 138 
A commitment to transparency and openness may seem the correct thing to do in view of due 139 
diligence towards scientific practice. (8) Nevertheless, the implementation of transparency 140 
per se may be limited or represent certain challenges. (11) Resource, technical, 141 
confidentiality or wider trust issues could be associated with detailing and providing access to 142 
all elements of the risk analysis process. For example, regarding risk assessment, difficulties 143 
in articulating the complicated nature of the task or the inherent uncertainty of scientific 144 
endeavour. Similarly, issues regarding the detailing of contradictory views during 145 
commonplace expert discussions and the potential to undermine the unanimity of the final 146 
scientific advice. (12, 13)  147 
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 148 
Nutrition risk assessment to derive micronutrient Dietary Reference Values (DRV) is an area 149 
where greater transparency and openness has been encouraged. (14) DRV are developed in 150 
the first two steps of the risk assessment process. The identification of a nutrient-related 151 
hazard in a food/food group is established in step one (nutrient-related hazard identification). 152 
The qualitative/quantitative evaluation of adverse health effects associated with a nutrient is 153 
established in step two (nutrient-related hazard characterisation). This constitutes the 154 
development of DRV. In a full risk assessment DRV (steps one and two) would be combined 155 
with a nutrient intake/exposure assessment (step three) to assess exposure in relation to the 156 
DRV (step four). (15)Once completed the scientific advice from the risk assessment is used 157 
to inform development of recommendations in risk management. Thus, the development of 158 
DRV can be considered a pre-cursor to the development of micronutrient recommendations. 159 
Recommendations are defined as population targets of micronutrient intake necessary for 160 
adequate growth, function and health throughout the human life span. These are widely used 161 
in monitoring and evaluating population intakes as well as developing public health policies, 162 
interventions and dietary risk communications (e.g., food-based dietary guidelines to help the 163 
population meet recommended intakes). (16) (14) 164 
 165 
The widespread use of DRV (directly or indirectly via recommendations) belies the 166 
complexity and uncertainty with which they are developed. The first stage of DRV 167 
development has been referred to as the nutrition problem formulation stage. During problem 168 
formulation risk managers and assessors are required to establish a shared understanding of 169 
the problem and the purpose of the risk assessment. (10) Previously, the primary focus of 170 
DRV development was to devise intakes related to nutrient deficiency or overconsumption. 171 
More recently the remit of DRV has expanded to also encompass intakes for health benefits 172 
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(including intakes to delay the onset of disease). Yet, the evidence base surrounding the role 173 
of nutrition on health has been far from certain. Hence, prevailing scientific knowledge is 174 
used to handle limitations and uncertainty in the evidence (unknown, unreliable or indefinite 175 
evidence), develop plausible assumptions and complete the DRV development process. (14, 176 
17) 177 
  178 
Guidelines have been produced to assist with the development of DRV (e.g., the Institute of 179 
Medicine Dietary Reference Intakes (DRI) for the United States of America and Canada; the 180 
EFSA NDA Scientific Opinion on principles for deriving and applying DRV). (18) (16) Yet, 181 
no standardised approach or agreed best practice has been used to set DRV. Furthermore, 182 
disparity has been observed in DRV developed by different national or international bodies 183 
(e.g., vitamin D DRV). The lack of agreed best practice and disparity in DRV has led to 184 
confusion amongst inter/national policy decision makers, health professionals, the food 185 
industry and consumers. (19)  186 
 187 
An open and transparent DRV process has the potential to assist with understanding why 188 
values differed between countries by clearly detailing what, why and how decisions were 189 
made, particularly regarding the degree of uncertainty in the evidence, how this was handled 190 
or influenced the strength of the final risk assessment conclusions/resultant reference values. 191 
(19, 20) This would inform the debate on DRV development best practice. Furthermore, 192 
increased documentation, understanding and accessibility to the DRV process could 193 
contribute to the responsible use of DRV throughout risk management and risk 194 
communication activities. (2, 14)  195 
 196 
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The European Commission supported network of excellence EURRECA (EURopean 197 
micronutrient RECommendations Aligned, FOOD-CT-20006-36196, 2007-2012) was tasked 198 
with reviewing the methodologies used to derive DRV, assessing the reasons for value 199 
disparity and the potential for methodological alignment across national and international 200 
DRV development. Early EURRECA findings highlighted the importance of the nutrition 201 
problem formulation stage to ensure risk assessment activities remained achievable whilst 202 
also fulfilling the requirements of risk managers. (20) Further research suggested DRV 203 
disparity was unlikely to be explained by differences in concepts, definitions or defined 204 
population groups. Instead it was considered likely to be due to different interpretations or 205 
assumptions taken whilst accounting for uncertainty and limitations during evidence 206 
evaluation. (19) Finally, research identified variation in the transparency of different types of 207 
bodies in relation to how risk managers integrated DRV with other types of advice to develop 208 
recommendations. (20) The current study built upon these previous findings. Transparency 209 
and openness during the DRV risk assessment process was explored, with a particular focus 210 
on how uncertainty in the evidence base was handled. Three areas of interest, likely to 211 
demonstrate handling of uncertainty in the evidence base, were identified during DRV 212 
development: the request to develop DRV; the process of DRV evidence evaluation and the 213 
integration of evidence to develop final DRV. 214 
215 
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Method 216 
Design 217 
Qualitative in-depth case studies explored the handling of uncertain evidence and the 218 
transparency of vitamin D and folate DRV development in six countries/regions: Australia & 219 
New Zealand (ANZ), the Netherlands (NL), the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 220 
Norway and Sweden, NOC), Poland (PL), Spain (ES) (21) and the United Kingdom 221 
(England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, UK).  222 
Each country/region produced a descriptive report based upon semi-structured interviews 223 
with at least two advisory committee members together with desk research (table 1). A 224 
common protocol was followed throughout. The interview schedule, desk research and final 225 
case study report all centred upon the transparency and handling of uncertain evidence in 226 
three pre-defined areas: (a) the request to develop DRV e.g., source of request, scope of 227 
request, reasons for the request; (b) the process of DRV evidence evaluation e.g. selection 228 
and evaluation of evidence (c) integration of evidence to develop final DRV e.g. formation of 229 
quantitative numbers and advisory committee report.  230 
Transparency and openness was qualitatively judged via the availability of accessible, 231 
understandable documentation on the DRV process (e.g., downloadable/ upon request 232 
meeting agendas, minutes and key discussion documents; ability to attend open meetings and 233 
consultations and documentation surrounding DRV; documented risk analysis policy, 234 
organisation role and responsibility, membership, declaration of interest; stakeholder 235 
involvement etc.).  236 
Vitamin D and folate were selected due to their prioritisation as micronutrients of interest in 237 
Europe. (22) Countries/regions were originally selected from Europe with a subsequent 238 
opportunity taken to also collect data in Australia and New Zealand. The countries/regions 239 
sampled represented diversity in the age and method of developing DRV as well as in 240 
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geographical location, socio-cultural factors and institutional infrastructure. Data sets were 241 
collected from Dec 2010 to Jun 2011. 242 
Interviews (table 1) 243 
Interviewees were recruited due to their involvement in the advisory committee and/or 244 
development of vitamin D or folate reference values. This included members of the advisory 245 
committee and/or members of relevant advisory committee working sub-groups. The 246 
response rate ranged from 33% (UK) to 100% (ES & PL). Consent was obtained by each 247 
participant, with interviews recorded and later transcribed verbatim. All data was made 248 
anonymous and held in accordance with the local data privacy laws (e.g., UK data protection 249 
act). (23) The semi-structured interview schedule was piloted and devised by the research 250 
team with questions focused upon the transparency and handling of uncertainty in the 251 
aforementioned three areas of DRV development.  252 
Desk research 253 
Sourced documents related to the development of vitamin D or folate DRV in each 254 
country/region. Key word searches were conducted of advisory committee websites, 255 
publication websites (e.g., PubMed Central) and search engines (e.g., Google). Documents 256 
referred to during the interviews and manual searches of references elicited several additional 257 
documents. Further information was obtained in the UK case study via observation at two 258 
open advisory committee meetings (14
th
 Feb 2011 & 7
th
 Jun 2011). Desk research key search 259 
terms included variants of the nutrient name (e.g., folate and folic acid), variants of the word 260 
DRV (e.g., micronutrient recommendations, nutrient intake values, nutritional objectives) 261 
and/or the advisory committee name (e.g., Health Council for the Netherlands). Excluded 262 
documents were not relevant to vitamin D or folate DRV, the specific country/region, human 263 
nutrition or healthy populations or were duplications from previous searches. Desk research 264 
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was led and organised by questioning the transparency and handling of uncertainty in the 265 
aforementioned three areas of DRV development.  266 
Analysis 267 
Initial interview and desk research analysis was conducted in the native language using 268 
template analysis and a skeleton coding structure created and modified by partners during 269 
preliminary analyses. (24) Case studies consisted of an English-translated summary of 270 
interview and/or desk research identified themes with illustrative quotes organised by the 271 
three areas, value request, evidence evaluation and final values. Construct validity was 272 
upheld by limiting the subjective collection of data and performing traceable literature 273 
searches. Internal validity was upheld by encouraging several interpretations of the data to be 274 
considered. Multiple sources of information (triangulation between interview, desk research 275 
and DRV reports where possible) were used to cross-reference (corroborate/dispute findings). 276 
The uniform framework of case study reporting allowed further analysis where cross case 277 
synthesis was used to describe and identify any differences or similarities across 278 
countries/regions in the transparency and handling of uncertainty. (25) One research team 279 
member conducted the cross-case synthesis.  The qualitative software NVivo (QSR 280 
International Pyt Ltd. Version 9, 2010), was used to organise case study data. A subsection of 281 
the data was cross-coded by another research team member. One fewer theme was identified 282 
by the second coder. This was subsequently dropped from further analysis. Agreement on 283 
remaining themes and sub-themes was 91%.  Interpretation of cross-case analysis results 284 
were reflected back to case study authors and amended where necessary.  285 
Data presentation 286 
Interview quotes have been displayed using double quotation marks (“) and italics. Verbatim 287 
quotes have been modified in publication for improved readability. Case study/desk research 288 
text has been displayed using single quotation marks (‘). The term micronutrient 289 
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recommendation was used in the interview schedule and throughout this study. This term 290 
could be translated and understood across the cases sampled as pertaining to either 291 
micronutrient DRV or the use of values to make recommendations.  292 
Note that quotes have been unaltered in this respect and differences in the terminology can be 293 
seen as cases refer to their respective micronutrient recommendations e.g., “The term ‘Nordic 294 
Nutrition Recommendations’ refers to a set of dietary reference values (DRVs) for essential 295 
nutrients that includes the average requirement (AR), recommended intake (RI), upper intake 296 
level (UL), lower intake level (LI), and reference values for energy”. (26) 297 
298 
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Results 299 
Transparency and openness of DRV process (i.e. documentation, understanding and 300 
accessibility) varied across the countries/regions (cases) and different areas of the DRV 301 
development process studied. Results have been presented below in the three areas studied: 302 
request to develop DRV; the process of DRV evidence evaluation; the integration of evidence 303 
to develop final DRV.  304 
 305 
1) Request to develop DRV (tables 1 and 2) 306 
In Spain, where multiple sets of DRV were developed by different individuals, teams and 307 
organisations (SENC, FESNAD, Universidad Complutense de Madrid), minimal 308 
documentation could be found to clarify details on the source, scope or reason for the request 309 
to develop DRV (meeting agendas/minutes, discussion documents, press releases, website 310 
pages, final report details, journal publications). However, the Spanish interview data were 311 
more informative and interviewees openly discussed details surrounding the request for 312 
previous DRV. In contrast, greater information (via desk research and interview data), on the 313 
request to develop DRV was available in countries/regions with an official set of DRV and a 314 
clear body tasked with their development, such as Australia/New Zealand (NHMRC/MOH), 315 
the Netherlands (HCN), the Nordic countries (NCM), Poland (IŻŻ) and the UK 316 
(COMA/SACN) (table 1).  317 
 318 
Regarding the source of the request to develop DRV Spanish interviewees cited the majority 319 
of activity was undertaken by independent and academic institutions. Whereas in the five 320 
cases of Australia/New Zealand, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Poland and the UK 321 
the requests were predominantly sourced from the government or within the advisory 322 
committee as a set programme of work.  323 
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Across all six cases the reasons provided for the request to develop DRV ranged from 324 
acknowledged discrepancy between local DRV and those of other countries, DRV age, the 325 
emergence of new data, a set time cycle for the programme of work, information provision to 326 
assist policy option selection and triggers from monitoring practices, such as clinical health 327 
outcomes or markers of chronic disease risk (e.g., neural tube defects, NTD; low-density 328 
lipoproteins). However, details on the final trigger to initiate a request for particular nutrient 329 
DRV to be reviewed or developed were not always transparent i.e. the influence of lobbying 330 
(professional, academic, commercial or special interest group) on initiating or suppressing 331 
any development of DRV. Similarly, the criteria for judging when DRV were ‘too old’, when 332 
there was ‘sufficient’ new evidence to initiate renewing DRV or at what point disease 333 
incidence constituted a public health issue to address was not always transparently 334 
documented. 335 
 336 
The scope of request differed between cases. In the Australian/NZ, Polish and Spanish cases 337 
the scope of the request centred upon the utilisation and adaptation of international DRV to 338 
each respective country/region (predominantly the USA/Canadian DRV in Australia/New 339 
Zealand and Poland; various international DRV in Spain). This was clearly detailed in 340 
Australia/NZ. The NHMRC were asked to assess the body of evidence used to establish the 341 
USA/Canadian DRV (and any relevant literature that had subsequently been released), and 342 
provide an opinion on one of four courses of action: whether they should adopt, adopt with 343 
minor changes, adopt with substantial changes or reject the USA/Canadian DRV in 344 
Australia/NZ. 345 
  346 
The remaining three cases (Netherlands, Nordic countries and UK), all referred to the 347 
importance of clarifying the scope of the request and iterative interactions between 348 
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government representatives and advisory committee members during the nutrition problem 349 
formulation (e.g., to demarcate risk assessment/risk management activities or develop values 350 
for deficiency/adequacy/optimal/toxicity). Problem formulation was deemed necessary to 351 
ensure the request would be both appropriate and achievable (e.g., scientific limits of 352 
knowledge and resource constraints such as expertise, finance, time). Transparency appeared 353 
to be the greatest regarding the current UK vitamin D DRV development process. Here, the 354 
public were allowed to attend an open meeting where the scope of the request was discussed 355 
(also known as terms of reference in the UK) and online access was made available for 356 
downloading detailed meeting minutes and discussion documents surrounding request 357 
clarification.  358 
 359 
- suggest insert tables 1 and 2 here -  360 
 361 
2) Process of evidence evaluation (tables 3 and 4) 362 
Several discussions were undertaken on how to evaluate and interpret evidence which 363 
contained methodological and theoretic uncertainties (e.g., folate assay method, folate 364 
equivalents, uncertainty factors, bioavailability factors, vulnerable population groups, 365 
mechanisms of action, multiple nutrient interactions). These discussions were present in the 366 
cases which adopted/adapted existing international DRV as well as those who developed their 367 
own DRV. For example, the Australia/New Zealand, Polish and Spanish cases made 368 
reference to the evidence evaluation previously conducted in the original DRV as well as the 369 
additional evidence evaluation required to ensure the adapted DRV were up-to-date and 370 
relevant for each respective country/region. 371 
 372 
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To increase the transparency and scientific rigour of the evidence evaluation process, four 373 
cases (ANZ, NL, NOC, UK, table 4), used protocols to guide evidence evaluation, address 374 
uncertainty in the data and limit interpretation bias. These evidence evaluation protocols 375 
differed slightly. Yet, all four cases provided guidance on the systematic reviewing of 376 
literature (including meta-analyses), the assessment of individual study quality/risk of bias 377 
and accounting for uncertainty when weighting or deciding the strength of the evidence base. 378 
 379 
Australia/NZ, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries used a series of checklists to assess 380 
study quality and a number of categories to differentiate between results from different study 381 
designs. The UK also utilised a series of checklists but discouraged the use of numerical 382 
grading. It was clearly acknowledged that a degree of subjective judgement was still required 383 
with the application of these protocols, especially when moving from the quality assessment 384 
of each study to collating the strength of the total evidence. Nevertheless, the following of 385 
protocol for evidence evaluation and reporting of results was seen by these four cases as 386 
important steps towards a standardised approach to the evidence evaluation decision-making 387 
process. 388 
 389 
- suggest insert tables 3 and 4 here -  390 
 391 
3) Integration of evidence to develop final DRV (table 5) 392 
Interviewees across all cases acknowledged that evidence evaluation did not constitute the 393 
end of the DRV development process. Evidence evaluation findings needed to be appraised in 394 
the context of the original request to form the final DRV. Expert judgement was required to 395 
take account of the underlying certainty of the evidence, decide the strength of evidence and 396 
conclude with specific reference values. This stage of the process appeared to be less 397 
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standardised with few transparent protocols available to aid the expert deliberation and 398 
consensus seeking decision making process. 399 
 400 
The four cases which employed evidence evaluation protocols (ANZ, NL, NOC, UK), 401 
appended these protocols to reports and they were used to guide descriptions of the strength 402 
and degree of certainty in the evidence that accompanied each DRV. In addition, prior to the 403 
publication of DRV reports the standard practices of peer review (NL, NOC, PL) and invited 404 
or open consultation (ANZ, NL, NOC, PL, UK), provided an element of transparency and 405 
credibility to the process. Nevertheless, from the interviews it was clear that considerable 406 
discussions occurred between the evidence evaluation stage and the creation of the final 407 
DRV, even in relation to the wording or terminology used to describe DRV concepts 408 
(particularly PL) or the strength of evidence/degree of uncertainty (particularly UK). 409 
However, the details from many of these discussions were rarely communicated in the final 410 
report.  411 
 412 
Two interviewees (ES, NL) specifically mentioned the exact discussions undertaken by those 413 
developing DRV were not commonly reported. Reasons cited for this included a concern for 414 
the confidentiality of those who developed the recommendations as well as a belief that it 415 
was unnecessary to report every aspect of discussions that occurred during the deliberations 416 
before a consensus was reached. An exception was observed in the Netherlands when a 417 
disagreement of an advisory committee member could not be resolved during the formation 418 
of the folate DRV. (27) Consequently, a footnote was added to the Dutch report detailing a 419 
minority position of disagreement regarding the expression of folate versus folic acid as well 420 
as folate equivalent selection.  421 
422 
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Discussion  423 
Transparency and openness of DRV process was not universally adopted across countries or 424 
areas of the DRV development process studied. Implementation of transparency policies may 425 
be limited by a lack of dedicated resources and best practice procedures, particularly to assist 426 
with the latter stages of reference value development.  427 
 428 
Findings aligned with previous research regarding transparency in risk management 429 
activities. (20) The countries with dedicated advisory committees for risk assessment 430 
activities (Australia/New Zealand, the Netherlands, Nordic countries, Poland and the UK) 431 
demonstrated greater transparency of DRV process than Spain, where co-ordinated action at a 432 
national level was in its infancy and DRV had been developed by dedicated individuals. 433 
Arguably, the Netherlands, Nordic countries and the UK appeared to display the most 434 
transparency (also potentially Australia/New Zealand, although the underpinning 435 
USA/Canadian DRV setting process was not studied). Similarly to the above, this could be 436 
explained by a greater legal and clarified role of the relevant advisory committees and their 437 
responsibilities (demarcation between risk assessors, risk managers and risk communicators), 438 
a higher political priority or greater dedication of resources for nutrition and a longer tradition 439 
of DRV development. Furthermore, both the Nordic countries and the UK were currently 440 
updating DRV at the time of study. Thus, the nature of transparency observed may have 441 
reflected the current increased calls for transparency and been associated with the most recent 442 
micronutrient DRV setting processes.  443 
 444 
All cases demonstrated differences in transparency (in general and specific to the handling of 445 
uncertain evidence) across the three a priori areas studied (value request, evidence evaluation 446 
and final values). Based upon these findings, the status quo for current best practice regarding 447 
RPHN-2013-007105_Manuscript_Transparency of scientific uncertainty_Accepted 21 
transparent and open handling of uncertainty in nutrition risk assessment has been discussed 448 
below.  449 
 450 
Regarding the request to develop DRV transparency was increased via documentation and 451 
accessibility to the iterative discussions between risk assessors, risk managers and others in 452 
problem formulation. These discussions acknowledged the uncertainty and limitations of the 453 
evidence base available to ensure the feasibility of the risk assessment task. This transparent 454 
detailing of the source, scope and reasons for any DRV request corresponded with guidance 455 
seen in a number of international risk assessment procedural documents (e.g., the nutrition 456 
problem formation stage before nutrition risk assessment activity in CODEX Alimentarius, 457 
defining the problem in EURRECA framework for setting micronutrient recommendations). 458 
(10, 14) 459 
 460 
Transparency in risk assessment evidence evaluation is designed to minimise the probability 461 
of bias. (28) Best practice for transparent handling of uncertainty in the cases studied referred 462 
to the documented protocols designed to guide and standardised the process of sourcing and 463 
interpreting evidence. Bias was reduced by employing an independent body to conduct the 464 
review and reproducibility increased by employing standardised systematic literature review 465 
processes. Difficulties were still seen regarding the handling of uncertainty during evidence 466 
evaluation and communicating how this influenced the quantification/qualification of risk 467 
(e.g., the merits of grading different types of evidence). In addition, whether restricting a 468 
review to evidence from randomised controlled trials or meta-analyses limited the scope of 469 
the review or the utility of the final advice/reference values. However, the constant updating 470 
and disclosure of evidence evaluation procedures in the most recent cases reflected an ability 471 
to detail the overall strength of evidence reviewed.  472 
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 473 
Few protocols were available to assist with the articulation of, or guide the transition from, 474 
evidence evaluation to the integration of evidence and development of quantitative 475 
values/final DRV. This has been highlighted previously, in the healthcare area, where 476 
difficulties have been observed translating evidence evaluation into scientific advice for use 477 
in recommendation/guideline development. (29, 30) These findings support the requirement 478 
for further initiatives such as the EFSA consultation exercise in 2013 on how to conduct 479 
consistent procedures for expert elicitation during risk assessment. (31)  480 
 481 
Cases demonstrated consensus seeking was an essential stage of the DRV development 482 
process, designed to increase validity and reliability of decisions rather than relying upon an 483 
individual’s judgement. However, it was difficult to identify the best practice for 484 
transparently developing quantitative DRV; values that require a certainty not always 485 
apparent in the underlying data. The production of a transparent DRV report documenting the 486 
complexity of evidence-based expert decision-making, the strength of advice and areas of 487 
uncertainty remained a challenge. This had the potential to pose subsequent problems for the 488 
interpretation of DRV by those outside the advisory committee (e.g., responsible for setting 489 
micronutrient recommendations/relevant toxicology risk assessment activities). (32-34)  490 
 491 
This study was based upon qualitative case studies. Therefore, the selection of 492 
micronutrients, countries and the three a priori defined areas of study may have limited 493 
external validity and the degree to which these findings can be transferred outside the sample 494 
studied. The authors recognise the study would have benefited from including analysis of 495 
other countries who develop micronutrient DRV e.g., the USA/Canada. The exploratory 496 
nature of the present study justified the use of a qualitative design and steps were taken to 497 
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limit biased interpretation. A common protocol and the three a priori defined areas of study 498 
were employed to maximise study rigour via clarity of the research goal and the consistent 499 
method of data collection, analysis and reporting. This also enabled the combination of data 500 
across countries. Construct validity was upheld by limiting the subjective collection of data, 501 
regular monthly research team meetings and performing traceable literature searches. Internal 502 
validity was upheld by encouraging several interpretations of the data to be considered. To 503 
maintain the cultural context and authenticity of the data the majority of qualitative 504 
interpretation was conducted in the native language and information from interviews, 505 
observation or desk research provided the ability to cross reference findings. The case studies 506 
(data collection, analysis and reporting) were led by the three a priori defined areas and did 507 
not represent the totality of the DRV development process. Nevertheless, they have provided 508 
an insight into the nature of transparency, in particular regarding the handling of uncertain 509 
data, available in an evidence-based decision making process across multiple 510 
countries/regions.  511 
 512 
Debate shall continue regarding the best practice for nutrition risk assessment, particularly 513 
handling uncertainty in the evidence surrounding nutrition, diet, lifestyle and health and 514 
rating the overall evidence underpinning DRV. (35) Future discussions may focus on 515 
adaptations to the risk analysis framework to facilitate increasing requirements for nutrition 516 
risk benefit assessment in the development of DRV. (26, 36) Furthermore, how to meet the 517 
challenge of incorporating developing evidence bases into risk assessment, such those related 518 
to individual differences (e.g., metabolomics), non-RCT study designs or whole diet 519 
approaches (e.g., epidemiology). (15) 520 
 521 
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It may not be possible or necessary or all countries/regions to follow an aligned DRV risk 522 
assessment procedure or for all reference values to be identical. However, transparency, as 523 
well as increasing the accountability and credibility of DRV development, can facilitate the 524 
sharing of best practice to inform the evolution of nutrition risk assessment. Therefore, the 525 
recent transparency initiatives from the EFSA, such as proposals to promote public access to 526 
risk assessment technical data are to be welcomed. (37) 527 
 528 
Conclusion 529 
Implementation of transparency policies may be limited by a lack of dedicated resources and 530 
best practice procedures, particularly to assist with the latter stages of reference value 531 
development. Challenges remain regarding the best practice for transparently communicating 532 
the influence of uncertain evidence on the final reference values. Resolving this issue may 533 
assist the evolution of nutrition risk assessment and better inform the recommendation setting 534 
process.535 
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Table 1. Country/region interview samples and folate and vitamin D DRV references 
  Folate and vitamin D DRV and associated updates 
Country  No.  (%    response 
rate) 
Folate Vitamin D 
ANZ 4 (57%) NHMRC 2006 (38) NHMRC 2006 (38) 
NL 4 (67%) HCN 2003, HCN update 2008 (27, 39) HCN 2000; HCN update 2008 (39, 40) 
NOC 4 (80%) NNR 2004 (41) 
NNR 2004, *NNR 2012 published subsequent to data 
collection (26, 41) 
PL 4 (100%) Jarosz & Bułhak-Jachymczyk 2008 (42)  Jarosz & Bułhak-Jachymczyk 2008 (42)  
ES 3 (100%) 
Moreiras 2011; Ortega 2011; Serra Majem 2001 (SENC); 
Martínez 2010 (FESNAD) (43-46) 
Moreiras 2011; Ortega 2011; Martínez 2010 (FESNAD) 
 (43, 44, 46) 
UK 2 (33%) COMA 1991, SACN folate 2006 (47, 48) 
COMA 1991, SACN vitamin D update 2007, *new vitamin 
D DRV expected 2014 (47, 49) 
DRV = Dietary Reference Values; ANZ = Australia & New Zealand; NL = Netherlands; NOC = Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden); PL = Poland; ES = Spain; UK = United Kingdom; NHMRC = Australian National Health and Medical Research Council; HCN = Health Council of 
the Netherlands (Gezondheldsraad); NNR = Nordic Council of Ministers Nordic Nutrition Recommendations; SENC = Spanish Society of Community 
Nutrition; FESNAD = Federación Española de Sociedades de Nutrición, Alimentación y Dietética; COMA = Committee on Medical Aspects of Food Policy; 
SACN = Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition. *recommendations under development at time of study data collection 
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Table 2 Request to develop DRV 
Value request Quotes: case study text or interview [case study/participant reference] 
Source of request “No, it has not been the Government as in other countries... there have been private initiatives but nothing coming from the 
Government” [ES] 
“…items of work can come to the SACN in three ways: they can come from Government, requests from Government; from the 
Committee itself; and from…anybody just writing to the Committee. The reality is the Committee’s workload means it’s 
mainly driven by Government.” [UK] 
Reason for request ”All nutrients are reviewed one way or the other every eight year and then they put special focus on some of them every time. 
And Vitamin D has been discussed very much in the last years, also in America, so that is why Vitamin D is one of the chosen 
nutrients” [NOC] 
“Concerning the folate, firstly quite huge discrepancies between Polish recommendations and those in other countries. 
Secondly, elevated blood homocysteine level and quite big percentage of Neural Tube Defects in Polish population. Also the 
health policy, how to improve the situation (…).” [PL] 
Scope of request “What we did is making the question more precise and operationalised it, like it is called, in co-operation with the MHWS. 
Let’s say, the original questioning is a bit adapted in such a way that we could better provide answers” [NL] 
The Chair emphasised the need for a broad risk assessment, which would inform 
government whether the newly available data on vitamin D has implications for 
UK public health policy.’ [UK] 
ANZ = Australia & New Zealand; NL = Netherlands; NOC = Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); PL = Poland; ES = Spain; UK = United 
Kingdom. “italics and double quotation marks denote interview quotes” ‘single quotation marks denote case study/desk research text’ 
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Table 3. Process of DRV evidence evaluation 
Evidence 
evaluation 
Quotes: case study text or interview [case study/participant reference] 
 
Protocols for  
evidence 
evaluation 
‘The NHMRC explains the reviewers were directed to take the body of evidence and key papers used to establish the 
USA/Canadian dietary reference intakes and provide an analysis of any vital missing documents and/or documents which 
were published after the Canadian dietary reference intakes were established, using the NHMRC’s six levels of evidence.’ 
[ANZ]  
“Historically we have had recommended intakes in Spain, as well as food composition tables, but it was not clear how they 
were made (...).” [ES] 
In the 2006 reconsiderations the committee applied a rating system for weighing quality of scientific evidence based on 
CBO’s “evidence based guideline development” and SIGN grading system, in which the highest level of evidence include 
only systematic reviews of good quality. [2 & 6, appendix C & D resp.]. Despite, there were various uncertainties related to 
scientific evidence. [NL] 
‘Systematic literature reviews will be performed to minimise potential reporting bias through comprehensive and reproducible 
searches using clearly defined search strategies together with clearly defined and described selections and reporting protocols. 
This means that the reviewing of literature will be more systematic in connection with NNR 5 than it has been in earlier 
rounds.’ [NOC] 
‘The consultation document [Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees, published by the Government Office for 
science 17
th
 Sep 2010] was circulated to members, along with a short paper “How SACN operates” to describe SACN 
practices relevant to the specific areas covered by the consultation questions. This was appended with a copy of the 
Committees framework for evaluation of evidence.’ [UK] 
ANZ = Australia & New Zealand; NL = Netherlands; NOC = Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); PL = Poland; ES = Spain; UK = United 
Kingdom. “italics and double quotation marks denote interview quotes” ‘single quotation marks denote case study/desk research text’ 
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Table 4 Protocols used to assess study quality/risk of bias across cases (Poland/Spain unknown) 
 Australia & NZ (NHMRC 
2000)(50) 
Netherlands  
(CBO 2007 & SIGN 50 2007) (51, 52) 
Nordic countries  
(NCM 2011) (53) 
UK SACN 2008) (54) 
Assessment of 
study quality/ 
risk of bias 
Quality checklist.  
 
Quality checklist.  Quality checklist (total quality score).  Quality checklist 
Six evidence categories Six evidence categories Three evidence categories  
I: RCT systematic review  
II: >=1 RCT 
III-1: Pseudo-RCT 
III-2: Comparative studies with  
concurrent controls, cohort, case-
control or interrupted time series 
III-3: Comparative studies with 
historical control, >=2 single arm/ 
interrupted time series without parallel 
control group 
IV: Case series, post/pre-test 
A1: Systematic reviews (2 grade A2 
studies+)  
A2: Randomised, double-blind 
comparative intervention study (good 
quality/size) 
B1: Systematic reviews of good quality (2 
grade B2 studies+) 
B2: Comparative (not A2), good quality 
cohort or patient case studies 
C: Non-comparative studies 
D: Opinion of the committee 
A: Low level of bias. Considered valid. 
High quality. Valid estimation of 
nutrient exposure. Control for 
confounders in design and analyses. 
B: Bias not sufficient to invalidate 
results. Do not meet all A category 
criteria. May be missing information 
thus difficult to assess limitations. 
C: Significant bias that may invalidate 
the results 
 
Strength of 
evidence 
summary 
Narrative summary 4 categories:  
Convincing: 1 grade A1or >=2 grade A1 
Probable: 1 grade B1 or >=2 grade B2 
Insufficient: 1 grade A2 or B2 or grade C  
Insufficient: Based upon the committee’s 
opinion (grade D) 
4 categories: 
Convincing (high): Causal/absence of 
relationship. 
Probable (moderate): Causal relationship 
Limited-suggestive (low): Suggestive of 
effect direction.  
Limited-no conclusion (insufficient): 
Limited quantity, inconsistent effect 
direction 
Narrative summary 
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Table 5. Integration of evidence to develop final DRV 
Final values Quotes: case study text or interview [case study/participant reference] 
Reporting of strength and 
uncertainty in evidence 
 
Published throughout the 2006 NRV document are justifications which state how each nutritional recommendation 
was established. The NHMRC states that a decision should be made about what is feasible and appropriate in a 
given situation and the extent to which reasonable standards have been met by the available body of evidence’. 
[ANZ]  
Although the NRV are evidence-based wherever possible, the data to establish recommendations is generally very 
limited (…) Therefore, the Working Party had to rely on subjective professional judgements to estimate 
recommendations from alternative age, gender or life stage categories.’ [ANZ] 
NNR 2004 where there is a chapter for each micronutrient where recommendation are stated followed by 
discussion of the evidence and uncertainty.’ [NOC]  
“Well, maybe not all uncertainties are published. In other words, it is clear that there have been discussions, 
comments, questions that have not been published (…).” [ES] 
 “(…) the exact discussion that takes place and the names of the committee members who said what, this is 
confidential.” [NL] 
ANZ = Australia & New Zealand; NL = Netherlands; NOC = Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); PL = Poland; ES = Spain; UK = United 
Kingdom “italics and double quotation marks denote interview quotes” ‘single quotation marks denote case study/desk research text’ 
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